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I am sure that scores of serious articles will be written about the 2
Live Crew litigation which began in February, 1990.
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I am sure that scores of serious articles will be written about the 2
Live Crew litigation which began in February, 1990. They will assess
and re-assess Miller v. California,' debate "community standards," de-
fine "prurient interest," and opine on the first amendment issues which
have been raised by the legal proceedings spawned by the recording, As
Nasty As They Wanna Be.2 Because I have had the pleasure of being
among those in the center of the dispute, I thought it might be helpful
to share some of the things I learned, and perhaps encourage others to
write about specific matters which I think are important.
A. The Role of the Press
Since the 2 Live Crew cases involved "high" law, "low" language,
race, and show business, they tapped an enormous well of publicity. I
was not surprised at the intensity or duration of the publicity, and I
think the media coverage may be one of the most overlooked first
amendment lessons of the cases.
The first amendment is a restraint on governmental power. Gov-
ernmental power is exercised by politicians. Politicians live and die in
the media: newspapers, television, radio, magazines. Nothing inhibits
government misconduct more than criticism from a free press. I have
not scientifically surveyed the press response to Broward County Sheriff
Nick Navarro's 2 Live Crew crusade, but the clippings, cartoons, edito-
rials and my conversations with reporters around the country lead me
* Professor of Law, Nova University; trial and appellate counsel for 2 Live Crew
and for Charles Freeman, convicted record seller. The author wishes to acknowledge
Beverly Pohl, Research Assistant, for participating in the preparation of this essay, and
for invaluable assistance throughout the 2 Live Crew litigation.
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2. The three major 2 Live Crew/As Nasty As They Wanna Be cases are
Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dock-
eted sub nom Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, No. 90-5508 (11th Cir., June 6, 1990)
(federal judge declared record obscene); State v. Freeman, No. 90-17446-MM-10 A
(Broward County Ct., Oct. 3, 1990) (appeal pending) (record seller convicted); State v.
Campbell, Nos. 90-17616-MM-10 A, B, C (Broward County Ct., Oct. 20, 1990) (all
three defendants acquitted of obscene live performance).
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to conclude that the vast majority of words used on the 2 Live Crew
cases supported freedom of speech and condemned or poked fun at the
Sheriff's actions.
Prosecutors, officers and politicians are all sensitive to public opin-
ion. Even Sheriff Navarro, after the acquittal of three performing 2
Live Crew members, seemed to want an end to the controversy. But the
interesting news is not Nick Navarro's reaction throughout these cases,
but the fact that out of the tens of thousands of prosecutors, police and
public officials, only a handful warred with As Nasty As They Wanna
Be, which when the controversy began, had been bought by 1.2 million
people.
So, I am more sanguine than many about the health of the first
amendment. The fact that throughout the country only a score of cases
were brought against those who sold the recording, and even fewer at-
tempts were made to censor 2 Live Crew's performances, attests to the
good judgment and constitutional loyalty of the overwhelmingly vast
majority of the law enforcement and political constabulary. 3 Two ex-
planations exist for the self-restraint exhibited by these officials: (1) a
clear understanding of the first amendment, and the difficult task of
overcoming the protections accorded presumptively protected speech,
music and art; and (2) a fear of critical press coverage which could
coalesce public opinion against the officials' actions. Representing 2
Live Crew gave me the opportunity to talk to many of the people con-
templating action against As Nasty As They Wanna Be or the group.
Of the two inhibiting factors, the threat of critical press coverage was
more telling than the threat of Miller v. California's first amendment
mandate.
3. As far as I have been able to determine, the few prosecutor-players were those
with a track record of over-zealousness. The State Attorney in one mid-Florida Circuit
has crusaded against what he perceives as pornography while delighting in publicly
describing in ancient Anglo-Saxon terms the sexual practice he decries. Dallas and
Cincinnati are other known anti-first amendment venues, and Westerly, Rhode Island,
which unsuccessfully sought to stop a performance (Atlantic Beach Casino v.
Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38 (D.R.I. 1990)), seemingly shares a puritanical heritage
with Dedham, Massachusetts, which precluded Henry and June, the first NC-17
movie, from its city's theaters. Coakey, Dedham Film Cancellation Draws Battle
Lines, The Boston Globe, Oct. 6, 1990, Metro Region, at 17.
[Vol. 15
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B. The Role of Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan4
The most threatening first amendment governmental misconduct is
a prior restraint. Since speech is presumptively protected, its suppres-
sion usually cannot precede judicial review. The 2 Live Crew brouhaha
began as a response to a blatant prior restraint.
A deputy sheriff purchased a copy of the As Nasty As They
Wanna Be cassette from a large Fort Lauderdale record store. His mis-
sion was prompted by a sour grapes letter to Sheriff Navarro from a
Miami golf-pro-turned-lawyer who had recently run against the incum-
bent Dade County (Miami) State Attorney with a spectacularly unsuc-
cessful campaign, in which Luther Campbell, 2 Live Crew's leader, had
supported the incumbent with a rap advertisement broadcast on black
radio stations. I think Sheriff Navarro paid little heed to the letter,
shipping it down his chain of command where, at some point, William
Kelly, a long retired J. Edgar Hoover pornography apparatchik who
was the Sheriff's "special consultant" on pornography, triggered the or-
der to buy the record. Kelly had close ties to certain "conservative fam-
ily oriented" fundamentalist organizations. The Miami lawyer was sim-
ilarly "connected."
Sergeant Mark Wichner was the officer assigned the task of buy-
ing the $8.99 cassette. He took it to his office, listened to it, and made
an attempt to transcribe many of the songs. Armed with the cassette,
his transcription, and an affidavit setting forth the details of his
purchase, he went to Broward County Circuit Court for a "probable
cause" determination. Although Florida law is silent on this process,
and United States District Judge Jose Gonzalez later viewed the proce-
dure as "bizarre," '5 the concept is not so legally farfetched. Rather than
having an officer determine whether something is "obscene" and then
arresting the purveyor, a de facto practice has existed of purchasing
books, magazines, or videotapes and presenting them to a judge for his
or her scrutiny. The Broward County Circuit Court Clerk's office main-
tained a "Probable Cause of Obscenity" file which contained 150 simi-
lar orders obtained over the past few years by police officers from vari-
ous municipal jurisdictions throughout the county.
Historically the practice has been to obtain the probable cause
finding and then return to the book or video store, repurchase the item,
and arrest the seller. That process then permitted the seller a full crim-
4. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
5. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 598.
1991]
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inal trial on the issue of whether or not the item was obscene under the
applicable Florida statutes and Miller v. California.6
In this case, Officer Wichner went to Circuit Judge Mel Gross-
man, who was the duty judge on the day of Wichner's courthouse trip.
Judge Grossman kept the cassette for several days before ultimately
issuing a probable cause order which, because it was the starting point
for all that ensued, is printed in its entirety below.'
Armed with the probable cause order, and its improbable reliance
on the Miami Herald's editorial decision-making, Wichner, at the di-
rection of his supervisors, began the prior restraint which triggered the
2 Live Crew litigation. A memorandum was prepared by Wichner for
6. Florida Statutes, section 847.001(7), provides the applicable definition of ob-
scenity, mirroring Miller:
"Obscene" means the status of material which:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) Depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
as specifically defined herein; and
(c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.
7. ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE OF
OBSCENITY
Upon application of Detective Mark Wichner of the Broward County
Sheriff's office, and prior to the filing of any criminal charges with the
office of the Broward State Attorney, the Court, in its Magistrate capacity,
on March 2, 1990, did review in its entirety the following material, to-wit,
a recording: "AS NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE", by the 2 Live Crew
as released by Skyy Walker [sic] Records, 3050 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite
307, Miami, Florida.
THE COURT being fully aware of the contents of the aforesaid ma-
terial and in conformity with this Court's duty to satisfy the requirements
for a speedy judicial determination as to the issue of obscenity, finds prob-
able cause to believe that the aforesaid material is obscene within the pur-
view of Florida Statute Section 847.011 and the applicable case law.
THE COURT also notes that this application of contemporary com-
munity standards is shared by as avid a First Amendment proponent as
the Miami Herald. That newspaper stated in an article appearing in its
edition of February 28, 1990, that "Many of 2 Live Crew's lyrics are so
filled with hard-core sexual, sadistic and masochistic material that they
could not be printed here, even in censored form."
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward
County, Florida, this 9th day of March, 1990.
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE MEL GROSSMAN
[Vol. 15
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distribution to deputies around the county. They were instructed to,
and did, inform all record store owners in the county that selling As
Nasty As They Wanna Be subjected them to possible arrest for violat-
ing section 847.011, Florida Statutes.
Thus the Sheriff, through the actions of his deputies, effectively
removed all copies of As Nasty As They Wanna Be from vendors' rec-
ord racks. No arrests were made because no vendor was willing to risk
a criminal prosecution over an $8.99 recording. No civil action was ini-
tiated by the Sheriff to determine whether As Nasty As They Wanna
Be was actually obscene. The probable cause order, and the Sheriff's
"friendly advices" were the end of Broward County sales, although
subsequent events prompted a second million copies to be sold around
the country.
While similar probable cause findings had been made in a handful
of places, including at least two by grand juries under the direction of a
Volusia County, Florida, State Attorney, 2 Live Crew made the deci-
sion to litigate in Broward County because it was convenient, close to 2
Live Crew's Miami base, and because South Florida was viewed as less
hostile to the first amendment than were other Florida venues.
The original federal complaint brought by the record company and
the four members of 2 Live Crew (Luther Campbell, Mark Ross, Chris
Wongwon and David Hobbs) sought a declaratory judgment that the
recording was not obscene. The complaint was quickly amended to in-
clude a count challenging the Sheriff's actions as a prior restraint.
Lost amidst the wave of publicity caused by Judge Gonzalez' June
6, 1990 decision that the record was obscene, was the half of his opin-
ion which condemned the Sheriff's procedures as "Nasty Suppression:"
[T]he Sheriff's actions in this case constituted a seizure of pre-
sumptively protected speech within the scope of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.
The First Amendment, rights of 2 Live Crew and the music
store owners to publish the recording and the public's right as an
audience were all infringed.
Indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate just how dramati-
cally informal censorship can impair the First Amendment. With
relative ease, every copy of Nasty in Broward County was sup-
pressed . . . . 8
8. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 598, 602.
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Judge Gonzalez then enjoined the Sheriff from engaging in future prior
restraint9 and ordered him to pay substantial attorneys' fees to 2 Live
Crew for prevailing on its prior restraint claims. 10
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan," the precedent for Judge Gonza-
lez' ruling, involved a Rhode Island pornography commission's review
of various publications, and letters to publishers warning them that
their books and magazines were objectionable and could be the subject
of state prosecutions. Justice Brennan wrote:
People do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats
to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come
around . . . The Commission's notices, phrased virtually as orders,
reasonably understood to be such by the distributor, invariably fol-
lowed up by police visitations, in fact stopped the circulation of the
listed publications . . . It would be naive to credit the State's as-
sertion that these blacklists are in the nature of mere legal advice,
when they plainly serve as instruments of regulation independent of
the laws against obscenity.12
Judge Gonzalez concluded that the Sheriff's approach was incon-
sistent with Freedman v. Maryland," Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad'4 and Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc.,'5 which de-
manded adherence to three rules in order to avoid an unconstitutional
prior restraint:
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving
that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second,
any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a
specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the
status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be
assured.'
Officer Wichner took no action designed to secure any of these
9. Id. at 603.
10. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
11. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
12. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
13. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
14. 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975).
15. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
16. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 601 (citing Southeastern Promo-
tions, 420 U.S. at 560 (emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 15246
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mandates. No judicial action other than the probable cause order was
ever contemplated by the Sheriff's office. The restraint was for an ex-
tended period, and there never would have been a judicial determina-
tion were it not for the 2 Live Crew federal lawsuit. Indeed, it was as if
As Nasty As They Wanna Be had been imprisoned for life, without a
trial. Therefore the federal suit was like a habeas corpus action,
designed to secure the freedom of the recording.
C. The Obscenity Trials
Having been forced to file an action to liberate their music, the
plaintiffs sought to place the burden of proof on the Sheriff to prove the
record was obscene, just as the State would have had that burden had a
criminal prosecution, or a civil proceeding, been instituted by the State.
The plaintiffs also sought to require proof of obscenity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
Those arguments were made despite the fact that the plaintiffs
were seeking the declaratory judgment and would ordinarily have had
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were
entitled to relief (i.e., that As Nasty As They Wanna Be was not
obscene).
The argument went this way: Although in the vast majority of de-
claratory judgment actions the plaintiff has the burden of proof, that is
not always the case. In assigning the burden, the court must first ex-
amine the underlying issues. 17 Especially when the suit is one to deter-
mine non-liability, the burden may shift to the defendant, This suit
was in that peculiar posture - the plaintiffs were forced to bring a
civil action to declare the record non-obscene - because the Sheriff
failed to provide a full, fair, and prompt adversary proceeding. The
burden of proving obscenity must fall on the censor' 9 precisely because
the Constitution is a restraint on governmental power. The government
must prove its basis for not observing the limits imposed upon it by the
first amendment. 20
17. Reasor v. City of Norfolk, 606 F. Supp. 788, 793 (E.D. Va. 1984).
18. BARCHORD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 404-405 (2d ed. 1941).
19. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 560.
20. Compare Aero Spacelines, Inc. v. United States, in which the plaintiff chal-
lenged a government board's conclusion of excessive profits:
•. the burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the
existence of the fact or facts upon which the rights and liabilities of the
parties depend is upon him who has the affirmative of the issue which
19911
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The appropriate standard of proof for a federal declaratory judg-
ment action involving the issue of obscenity has never been addressed
by the Supreme Court. There is abundant precedent, however, for us-
ing a "clear and convincing" standard in certain civil cases."1 The rea-
sonable doubt standard has rarely been applied in civil litigation. 22 Be-
cause this federal action was one to protect the most important of
federal rights, and to avoid subsequent criminal actions against retail-
ers, the plaintiffs requested a reasonable doubt standard - to be the
defendant's burden - or at least a clear and convincing standard. De-
forms the basis of the controversy, without regard to whether lie is plaintiff
or defendant in the suit.
530 F.2d 324, 331 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citations and footnotes omitted).
21. Standard of proof was addressed at length in California v. Mitchell Broth-
ers'. Santa Ana Theater:
The purpose of a standard of proof is "to instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correct-
ness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Three stan-
dards of proof are generally recognized, ranging from the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard employed in most civil cases, to the "clear and
convincing" standard reserved to protect particularly important interests in
a limited number of civil cases, to the requirement that guilt be proved
"beyond a reasonable doubt" in a criminal prosecution. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 (1979). This Court has, on several occa-
sions, held that the "clear and convincing" standard or one of its variants
is the appropriate standard of proof in a particular civil case. See Adding-
ton, 441 U.S. at 431 (civil commitment); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (libel); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)
(deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denatu-
ralization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943) (de-
naturalization). However, the Court has never required the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard to be applied in a civil case. "This unique
standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitution, is regarded
as a critical part of the 'moral force of the criminal law,' In re Winship,
397 U.S., at 364, and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually
in noncriminal cases." Addington, 431 U.S. at 428.
454 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1981) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 97 n. 5 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing to cases referred to in 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, nn. 2-12 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981)). Justice Stevens
points out that the Court has used the reasonable doubt standard in several civil con-
texts, and cites to: Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.,
293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (invalidity of patent); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 502, 522
(1922) (constitutional invalidity of state statute); Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122,
134 (1889) (invalidity of title); cf. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308,
317 (1902).
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spite the Supreme Court's past flexibility on this, issue,2" Judge Gonza-
lez would not bend.
The Sheriff's counsel accepted the burden of proof, but the Court
refused to require a standard of proof beyond a preponderance of the
evidence. One important issue which may be resolved by the pending
appeal of the federal order is the proper standard of proof to be used in
cases where a plaintiff is forced by an unconstitutional prior restraint to
litigate as a civil plaintiff the right to first amendment protection for
his or her work. It certainly is an issue demanding critical analysis.
The unique posture of the federal litigation brought against Sheriff
Navarro led to an ironic conclusion: the presumptively protected record
was freed from the prior restraint, but then reincarcerated as obscene
in a civil proceeding using only a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. Strong doctrine supports the argument that where critical factual
findings are to be made on important constitutional issues, at least
"clear and convincing," if not "beyond a reasonable doubt" must be
the standard to insure the integrity of such important fact finding."2 4
Whatever the standard of proof, a district court's findings of fact
ordinarily are subject to appellate review under the difficult "clearly
23. Compare Santosky v. Kramer:
Moreover, the degree of proof required in a particular type of pro-
ceeding "is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the
judiciary to resolve." Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284. "In cases involving indi-
vidual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a mini-
mum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.'" Addington,
441 U.S. at 425, (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (CA
4, 1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dism'd
sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof - "clear
and convincing evidence" - when the individual interests at stake in a
state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substantial
than mere loss of money." Addington, 441 U.S. at 424. Notwithstanding
"the states' 'civil labels and good intentions,'" id., at 427,(quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-366), the Court has deemed this level of cer-
tainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of govern-
ment-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with "a
significant deprivation of liberty" or "stigma." 441 U.S. at 425, 426.
455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
24. See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 454
U.S. 90 (1981) (the choice of standard of proof in a civil nuisance abatement case
involving obscenity, is a matter of state law, but the first and fourteenth amendments
do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
1991]
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erroneous" standard. 25 In a first amendment case, however, the appel-
late court "has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of
the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' "28 Al-
though Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union involved libelous speech
and not obscenity, the Court analogized the need for independent ap-
pellate review of facts impacting on first amendment rights. Citing Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion in Roth v. United States:2 7
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility
by saying that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled
the questioned matter as 'obscene,' for, if 'obscenity' is to be sup-
pressed, the question whether a particular work is of that character
involves not really an issue of fact but a question of constitutional
judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.2
Thus, while the Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard insulates
most lower court findings of fact from adverse appellate review, Judge
Gonzalez' finding that As Nasty As They Wanna Be is obscene is not
similarly insulated. The trial record of the plaintiffs' case offers much
in the area of artistic and literary value that Judge Gonzalez ignored.
So even though Sheriff Navarro had the advantage of a civil burden of
proof, his victory may not withstand appellate review.
No matter what the ultimate outcome, it was a direct result of the
civil finding of obscenity in federal court which prompted the two crim-
inal proceedings in state court. This lead to the confusing scenario of a
record seller being found guilty of the criminal obscenity charge of sell-
ing the record declared civilly obscene by Judge Gonzalez, while three
2 Live Crew members were acquitted of obscenely performing the same
songs before a paying audience.29
Charles Freeman
Judge Gonzalez' Order was released on June 6, 1990, to a packed
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
26. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U*.S. 485, 499
(1984) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284-286).
27. 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957).
28. Id. at 507 n. 25 (emphasis in original).
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federal courtroom. The first amendment precedent he set condemning
prior restraints was swallowed up by his declaration that As Nasty As
They Wanna Be appealed to the prurient interest of the average person
in Broward County, described sexual conduct defined by the State in
patently offensive ways, and that the recording lacked serious literary,
artistic, scientific or political value.
The fact that a record had never before been declared obscene,
added to the racial issues generated by the record's ghetto patois, com-
bined with the press' natural protectiveness of first amendment rights,
made the order big news. So big that one record merchant, Charles
Freeman, the owner of E. C. Records in a Fort Lauderdale African-
American community, decided to protest the ruling and capitalize on
the publicity.
Freeman, a savvy, charming, militant entrepreneur, was stunned to
learn that the recording was now federal contraband. A quick study, he
decided to continue carrying the record and challenged the Sheriff to
arrest him. The press, delighted with this solo example of civil disobedi-
ence, flocked to E. C. Records, and was present when Eugene
McCloud, a black detective in the Sheriff's Organized Crime Tactical
Unit, appeared to make an undercover purchase of As Nasty As They
Wanna Be on Friday, June 8, 1990. McCloud asked for a copy and
Freeman obligingly asked McCloud if he wanted to hear a few cuts
from the album before buying it. McCloud said "yes" and Freeman
placed an album on a turntable, sending the sounds of "The Fuck
Shop" to the television cameras, and then McCloud, happy with what
he heard, bought a record and a cassette for $18. Then he arrested
Freeman, to the delight of the press and of the Sheriff, who had Free-
man held outside his shop for forty minutes until the Sheriff himself
could arrive to make the misdemeanor collar of Freeman official, and
escort him to jail.
After that, Good Morning America's satellite television truck and
a host of other media made their way to E. C. Records, making it a
kind of cult stop for first amendment groupies.
Club Futura
At the same time, the press was building the confrontation be-
tween Luther Campbell and Sheriff Navarro. Campbell, a 29 year-old
record entrepreneur, had built a multi-million dollar a year business in
five years, starting by selling his records from the trunk of his car, and
had catapulted to fame (or infamy) with a series of explicitly sexual
1991]
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rap records. He was scheduled to lead 2 Live Crew's performance at a
Hollywood, Florida night club called Club Futura. The date had long
preceded Judge Gonzalez' order.
The Sheriff, whose political career was based upon his breaking
Florida law by switching parties (Democrat to Republican) too close to
official qualifying time,30 and who had been, as Sheriff, threatened with
contempt by both federal3" and state judges (for jail overcrowding and
lack of courthouse security, respectively),- now was faced with a per-
formance which the press led him to perceive was in violation of Judge
Gonzalez' order.
Detective McCloud again got the call. As the press carried
messages back and forth between Campbell and Navarro, McCloud
was designated the point man in a fourteen person mixed-gender task
force culled from the Organized Crime and Public Corruption units of
the Sheriffs Department. Their job was to go to Club Futura as under-
cover couples to hear, in McCloud's words, whether any song from As
Nasty As They Wanna Be was sung.
Four couples, eight deputies, in their sportiest clothes, armed with
mini-microcassette recorders, and provided with $60 per couple to
purchase tickets and drinks, staked out the 2 Live Crew show at Club
Futura shortly after midnight on June 10, 1990. Another six detectives
formed the backup team to effectuate the arrests which were pre-or-
dained because the sounds of "C'mon Babe," "Me So Horny," "If You
Believe In Havin' Sex," and "The Fuck Shop" were an essential ele-
ment of 2 Live Crew's show.
Rather than risk the ire of the crowd, the deputies apprehended
Campbell and Chris Wongwon after the show, as they were being
driven home by Campbell's driver. Mark Ross, the lead rapper, went
home separately and the fourteen officers, apparently unable to follow
two cars, did not arrest him that night. He was given a misdemeanor
summons at my house two weeks later, in an effort to avoid another a
media event. Campbell and Wongwon were transported to the County
Jail and booked on the misdemeanor charge of participating in an ob-
scene performance "before live people." David Hobbs, the fourth Crew
member who mixed the records at Club Futura, making the instru-
mentals for this unique form of hip hop music which formed the back-
drop for the four-letter words, was not arrested. The deputies did not
30. Polly v. Navarro, 457 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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see him singing; he only hummed.
The Trial Issues
The defenses of Freeman, and of Campbell, Ross and Wongwon
were rife with small issues which were essential to a complete defense.
Although the burden of proof was clear - proof beyond a reason-
able doubt - many evidentiary issues had to be addressed. The State
wanted to introduce Judge Gonzalez' civil judgment of obscenity. De-
fense in limine motions in both cases successfully precluded introduc-
tion or mention of the Gonzalez order.3 2
The State also wanted to introduce a State prepared transcript of
the recording, As Nasty As They Wanna Be, in Freeman, and a tran-
script of the taped "Club Futura" performance in the Campbell case.
Defense in limine motions were successful in both cases, under section
90.403 of the Florida Evidence Code.3 Excluding the transcript in the
Freeman case was a clear victory, but throughout the trial the prosecu-
tors unsuccessfully sought to use the transcripts (which took officers
over five working days to prepare) as memory recollection aids so the
officers could interpret their sometimes unintelligible recordings. Their
unsuccessful recollection struggles with the Crew's common language
descriptions of fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation (but not pederasty -
why do these words sound so nasty?)3 4 made the trial amusing.35
32. The basis of exclusion was that civil judgments, even if final (and this one
was not), are not admissible in criminal cases because the higher burden of proof in a
criminal case makes the civil judgment irrelevant, and because the only value, if there
were any relevancy, would be to prejudice the defendant. See Forrest v. State, 513 So.
2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Dubose, 11 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1943).
33. That section provides in pertinent part: "Relevant evidence is inadmissible if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
34. See Hair: The American Tribal Love Rock Musical, "Sodomy" (RCA
Victor original Broadway Cast recording May 6, 1968) (show opened April 29, 1968,
Biltmore Theater, New York, N.Y.).
35. The press' problems in reporting the trial were captured by Mike Clary's
New Times review of the trial:
The trial of the 2 Live Crew on obscenity charges was billed as a First
Amendment case, so all of the serious newspapers and network television
stations sent reporters, each one dispatched by an editor who saw not only
a chance to use words such as "sex," "horny," and "nasty" in daily cover-
age, but also the phrase "chilling effect." Nothing sends more chills of
righteousness up the tingling spines of serious editors than the threat of
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Entertainment aside, the important legal issues raised by a first
amendment criminal trial really turn on the beginning and end of the
case: jury selection and jury instructions.
Jury Selection
No other crime uses "community standards" as an essential ele-
ment of the offense. Burglary, auto theft, drug dealing, robbery, rape
and murder prosecutions do not require a jury to determine "whether
the average person, applying contemporary community standards,"
would find that the act appeals to or offends any community view or
interest. All other crimes provide real notice to the alleged wrongdoer,
and require only that the jury determine the facts relevant to the ele-
ments or the defenses.
Only criminal "obscenity" turns on an after the fact determination
by a jury as to the mores of the average person vis a vis the prosecuted
conduct. If we are to continue using this strange test conjured by
Miller v. California,"6 one that imposes a burden upon six or twelve
people to assess the values, experience, religious, cultural, generational,
racial, ethnic, sexual preference, political, economic, psychologic, and
educational profiles of thousands or millions of people in a community,
then to determine whether their "prurient interest" has been appealed
to,37 or if they would be patently offended, then the jury selection pro-
cess must provide a reliable vehicle for finding these omniscient people.
Just stating the problem reveals the farcical nature of the attempt,
but given the present status of the law, defense counsel's job is to play
an effective role in this serious judicial soap opera of sex.
Florida utilizes voter registration lists as its only source of poten-
censorship.
Of course none of the mainstream media represented wa; actually to
print or air any of the words at issue in the trial. The irony of this was not
lost on the reporters, many of whom spent ergs of creative energy trying to
come up with inventive euphemisms to reflect the Crew's lyrics. Many
newspapers, including the Miami Herald and the St. Petersburg Times,
went for dashes, as in "f-." The New York Times' Sara Rimer spoke of
the "power of the penis," and did use the rappers' favorite form of female
address, "bitch." Other papers, including the Los Angeles Times, wouldn't
even go that far.
Clary, The Circus Came To Town, New Times, Vol. 5, No. 28, Oct. 31, 1990, at 18.
36. 413 U.S. 15.
37. In Florida, "prurient interest" is defined as a "morbid or shameful interest in
sex." FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION § 847.
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tial jurors. The data in Broward County revealed that black citizens,
who comprise 13.5 % of the population, are only 8.5 % of the registered
voters.3 8 Persons under 25 years of age are 23.5 % of the population, 9
but are registered voters at an even lower percentage.4 0
The jury pools in Freeman and Campbell starkly attested to these
disparities. In Freeman, only one of 35 persons in the venire was black.
There appeared to be no persons under 25, and of the twelve put in the
box for initial consideration, none was under 25 and all were white.
An objection was made in Freeman, but the trial judge, correctly
citing Florida law, 4 ruled that since the voter registration lists were
non-discriminatory, the random and natural consequences of their use
was not a basis for challenging the venire.
The first twelve in the box, nine upper-middle-class white women
and three men, were as far as we got in Freeman. The trial judge,
Judge Paul Backman, did not believe in a free associational voir dire.
(He told me, as the later Campbell case went into the fourth of its six
days of jury selection, that he would have had a jury on the first day.)
But even had he granted more latitude, the twelve offered no valid
challenges for cause, and with the three peremptories per side4' we
never got beyond those twelve. The State struck a young man who
worked in a newspaper press room; the defense struck a man who
seemed antagonistic. The jury was comprised of five well educated
white professional women and an hispanic man. After the conviction of
Freeman, the press profiled the jury members (who were unwilling to
even talk to the media), revealing that one of them lived in the fourth
most expensive assessed value house in Broward County - $3.6 million
- probably more than the assessed value of all of Sistrunk Boulevard,
the main African American business street in Fort Lauderdale. There
is no legal relevance to this fact, but it underscores the distance be-
tween Miami's Liberty City, home of the 2 Live Crew music and the
38. Miami Herald, Oct. 2, 1990 (BR), at 1.
39. Broward Economic Development Board, 1989 data (personal communication,
Lou Sandora).
40. The Broward County Voter Registration Office data as of October 8, 1990
showed that registered voters age 18-20 comprise only 2.9% of the total registration.
Ages 21-35 represent 22.9% of the total.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1989); Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 800 (Fla.
1985). The constitutionality of the use of voter registration lists was recently upheld in
California. People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (Cal.
1990).
42. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350.
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site of recent race riots, and the jury's white upper-middle-class com-
munity. The jury was obviously drawn from lists which under-
represented the Crew's and Freeman's peer groups.
The fact that the Campbell jury was more representative does not
detract from the serious defects in the jury selection process. The sys-
tem is a lottery, with luck playing the major role in deciding which
persons will first appear in the box for initial voir dire. Obviously every
jury trial involves the same "luck of the draw," but where the offense
itself turns on the ability to divine the socio-sexual views of the commu-
nity, the lottery well should contain numbers which refiect the commu-
nity, not just those who register to vote.43
The media attention on the Freeman jury problem may have
helped to open the selection process in the 2 Live Crew performance
case which commenced three days after Freeman's conviction. Freeman
left the courtroom angrily shouting "[t]hey don't know nothing about
the ghetto." The press, faithful reporters of race and class divisions in
our society, pursued the obvious point of Freeman's remarks, research-
44ing and writing about Broward County's juries.
In contrast to Judge Backman in the Freeman trial, Judge June
LaRan Johnson provided wide latitude in voir dire for the 2 Live Crew
trial. The fifty-one people who were all ultimately put in the box were
slightly more diverse than the Freeman venire. Six black potential ju-
rors were included, although only three potential jurors were under
twenty-five. The ultimate jury was the product of six and one-half days
of wide-ranging voir dire, the successful use of jury sequestration as a
defense tactic to scare away the least acceptable jurors,45 the luck of
drawing a varied lot (some of whom educated the whole potential panel
by their responses to prosecution questions46), and the prosecutors' fail-
ure to keep track of the agreed-upon process of passing and striking,
allowing the defense to accept the panel and foreclose the three prose-
43. A frequently recommended supplemental source of names is licensed drivers.
See ALA. CODE § 12.16.57 (1975); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE. § 197 (West 1990). The
trial judge in Campbell declined our invitation to break that new ground.
44. See Miami Herald, supra note 37.
45. The least acceptable jurors were presumed to be middle- class white women
with six-to-sixteen year-old children, who would find sequestration difficult.
46. One person declared himself a "fan" of 2 Live Crew. Another likened the
prosecution to "Nazi Germany." A third described instances of police brutality in the
black community. One prospective juror kept asking the prosecutors about topless and




Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/10
Rogow
cution back strikes which they should have exercised earlier.
This jury had a 65 year-old Jewish mother of a condominium cir-
cuit entertainer, a 76 year-old former sociology professor, a
fortysomething principal of an integrated middle school whose sister
(unknown to the State) was a criminal defense lawyer, and a 26 year-
old diesel mechanic who knew of Jim Morrison's (The Doors) arrest for
indecent exposure in Miami twenty years ago. The prosecutors were too
young to appreciate that anyone knowing the Morrison case would
know it only out of sympathy.
A black woman juror lived six blocks from the county's two largest
adult bookstores, which are just across the street from the Sheriff's of-
fice substation. The sociology professor taught at Howard University
during the 1960's, a fact never learned by the prosecutors, and never
pursued by the defense, having heard enough of the State's voir dire to
want her. The Jewish mother knew of Redd Foxx's bawdy songs from
the 30's, while the prosecutors only remembered him from television's
Sanford & Son. She became the post-trial jury media star, appearing
on The Donahue Show and asking what was the big deal, "Even Dr.
Ruth says, 'love your penis.'"
In fact, these jurors conducted a long post-acquittal press confer-
ence; the retired sociology professor was hired to write an opinion piece
for the local newspaper, 47 and the foreman, who was gay, "came out of
the closet" in an interview with a South Florida news and arts
weekly.48
Thus, jury selection in the Campbell case liberated more than the
defendants.
Jury Instructions
The critical jury instruction in an obscenity case is the "serious
literary, artistic, political and scientific value" prong of Miller v. Cali-
fornia.49 As explained by Pope v. Illinois,50 the "value" issue is not a
community standard, it is a national inquiry:
Just as the ideas a work represents need not obtain majority ap-
47. Bailey, 2 Live Crew Juror Says Trial Reminiscent of Blacklist, Sun-Senti-
nel, Oct. 28, 1990, at 1H.
48. Mullin, Jack Thompson and the Truly Obscene, New Times, Oct. 31-Nov. 6,
1990, at 12 (Miami's News and Arts Weekly).
49. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
50. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
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proval to merit protection, neither, insofar as the First Amendment
is concerned, does the value of the work vary from community to
community based on the degree of local acceptance it has won. The
proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given
community would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable
person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole.
Of course, as noted above, the mere fact that only a minority
of a population may believe a work has serious value does not mean
the "reasonable person" standard would not be met.5
In both the Freeman and Campbell trials the prosecution sought
to turn Pope and Miller inside out and convince the trial judge that
material was obscene if any reasonable person would find that the ma-
terial lacks serious artistic, etc. value. In the Freeman case the trial
judge initially took the State seriously, but overnight re-read the cases
provided to him and came back in the morning with this instruction:
The value of the material: In order for you to find that this mate-
rial is obscene you must also find that taken as a whole it lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. If any reasona-
ble person would find that the material has such value it is not
obscene even if it appeals to the prurient interest in sex, and even if
it depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way.
If it has serious literary or artistic effort, or if it attempts to
convey scientific information or political points of view, it cannot be
obscene.52
The Campbell trial judge gave the same instruction, although she
too was confused by the State's argument, and when actually reading
the instruction to the jury, slipped and said it the State's way. A mid-
instruction objection and bench conference cured the error, and actu-
ally permitted reinforcement of the value prong of Miller. The jury in
this case rested upon the value test, finding the performance to have
had serious political, literary and artistic value.53
51. Id. at 500, 501.
52. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, State v. Freeman, No. 90-17446-MM-10 A (Broward County Ct., Oct. 3,
1990) (setting forth the given instruction).
53. The Mapplethorpe jury in Cincinnati also used Miller's value test to acquit
Dennis Barrie, the Cincinnati Art Museum Director charged with obscenity. Walsh,
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Why did the Freeman jury come to a different conclusion? One
explanation may be the trial judge's supplemental instruction requested
by the jury which was obviously struggling with the Miller test. It had
asked to be reinstructed shortly after retiring and had been told to rely
upon their collective recollections. Within an hour, the jury asked to
hear "the three prongs of the Miller test," and the judge said he would
re-instruct them on the substantive law of the case. However, the judge
went beyond that in his supplemental instruction, telling the jury it
could determine obscenity without the aid of any expert testimony.
Since the defense's entire case was expert testimony, giving that sup-
plemental instruction which was not responsive to the jury's pointed
Miller question may be the error upon which Freeman's conviction is
ultimately reversed.
The United States Supreme Court has said: "Particularly in a
criminal trial the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word."5 4
This is especially so with regard to supplemental instructions "since the
jury will rely more heavily on such instructions than on any other sin-
gle portion of the original charge. '55
In Freeman's case, the supplemental instructions "last words"
were to a jury twice seeking guidance on Miller v. California. Instead
the jury received final, supplemental instructions which went beyond its
inquiry and told the jury it had the right to disregard the defense testi-
mony. The proper course is to limit a reinstruction "to direct response
to the jury's specific request. Indeed, to do otherwise might not only
create confusion in the minds of the jurors but might give the appear-
ance of placing the trial judge in the role of an interested advocate
rather than an impartial arbiter."56 Thus, like all cases, big and small,
Advice Offered to 2 Live Crew Jurors, Sun Sentinel, Oct. 14, 1990, at lB.
The 2 Live Crew jury was moved to find political value by the rhythmic chants of
"F- Navarro and F- Martinez," the Broward Sheriff and the Florida Governor.
The artistic and literary evidence came from John Leland, Newsday's music critic, and
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., a Duke University English Professor.
54. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946).
55. Henry v. State, 359 So. 2d 864-868 n.3 (Fla. 1978) (citing, United States v.
Carter, 491 F.2d 625, 633 (5th Cir. 1974)) ("a trial judge must be acutely sensitive to
the probability that the jurors will listen to his additional instructions with particular
interest. . . . Thus the court must exercise special care to see that, . . inaccuracy or
imbalance in supplemental instructions do not poison an otherwise healthy trial.").
56. Id. at 867 (1978) (citing East v. State, 339 So. 2d 1104, 1106 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1976)) ("When a jury calls for additional instruction and clearly delineates the
area of its request, it is usually better for the trial court to remain within such area.").
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the jury instructions are a critical matter, and error in them may be the
key to making Freeman's outcome symmetrical with 2 Live Crew's
result.
Conclusion
The 2 Live Crew saga will continue through federal and Florida
courts for some time. Charles Freeman's initial appeal to the Florida
Circuit Court is on the horizon. 58 The federal appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit will probably not be argued until the Spring of 1991.
Whatever may be the outcome of those cases, the acquittal of 2
Live Crew in the Club Futura performance case seems to have left the
most lasting mark. Their acquittal of obscenity for singing in public
what they sang on a recording designed for private consumption, un-
derscored the absurdity of using the law to determine the value of art.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Pope v. Illinois calls for re-exami-
nation of the Miller v. California standard:
I think we should be better advised to adopt as a legal maxim what
has long been the wisdom of mankind: De gustibus non est dispu-
tandum. Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no use
litigating about it. For the law courts to decide "what is beauty" is
a novelty even by today's standards. 9
The prosecutions of As Nasty As They Wanna Be, in all their per-
mutations, attest to the wisdom of Justice Scalia's vievi. While it has
been great fun for me, and a source of serious intellectual stimulation,
the energies spent by all the participants could have worked toward
solutions of more serious problems than what to do with some dirty
57. The Freeman case presents other appellate issues, among them the failure to
instruct the jury that the "average person" meant adult average persons; and the fail-
ure of the trial court to admit other records by The Ghetto Boys and Ice Cube, which
contained comparable lyrics. In addition, the trial court refused to admit a host of
salacious materials purchased throughout Broward County which the defense argued
was relevant to "prurient interest," for these materials were designed to demonstrate
that term in action.
58. On November 16, 1990, the trial judge denied a motion for new trial. Free-
man was later sentenced to pay the maximum fine, $1,000, to a local school for the
performing arts and to pay court costs of $87. The notice of appeal was filed December
12, 1990. Under Florida law, the Circuit Court will hear the appeal, then discretionary
review may lie in the District Court of Appeal.
59. Pope, 481 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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words. Even those who took the words literally, like one of the co-con-
tributors to this volume, have misused their energies. Unpleasant words
will never be erased from our society. Unpleasant deeds may be, but
not by trying to censor the descriptions of unpleasantness. It is better to
hear the words and address the thoughts they convey than to suppress
the words so the thoughts may fester without the public airing which
can lead to progress.
To know the 2 Live Crew story is to know a recurring phenomenon
created by those who fail to understand history. Censorship cannot sur-
vive the human desire to know and judge things for one's self. No law
judge or jury will ever eradicate that irrepressible instinct. We could
have a thousand obscenity trials, but words and thoughts about sex will
never be limited to a missionary view. "Prurient interest, patently of-
fensive descriptions of sexual conduct and serious artistic, literary, po-
litical or scientific value" should be discussed someplace - anyplace -
other than the courts.
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